Policy
If your network builds the charger on your street, who pays for it? That is a second decision, and a different regulator makes it
We have already covered whether your distribution network should be allowed to own the kerbside charger. That is the question the AEMC is consulting on. But saying yes to it does not decide whose bill the charger lands on. A second decision does, it belongs to the AER rather than the AEMC, and the difference between its two possible answers is the difference between every customer paying and only the drivers who plug in paying.
Energy Networks Australia has asked the AEMC to change the rules so distribution networks can
roll out kerbside electric vehicle charging infrastructure. The AEMC’s consultation paper
says ENA submitted the request to address what it describes as a
chicken and egg
problem with EV uptake and charger deployment, and to
unlock affordable EV charging
that is accessible to the public. ENA argues a network
rollout would deliver benefits including improved utilisation of existing distribution network
assets
and faster, cheaper deployment.
Set aside for a moment whether you find that convincing. Assume the AEMC agrees and networks get the option. Your next question, as someone who pays a network charge every quarter whether or not you own an EV, is simple: does this go on my bill?
The honest answer is that the AEMC is not the body that decides.
Two decisions, two regulators
The AEMC’s own consultation paper sets out the sequence. The AER classifies distribution
services. If it decides a service is a direct control service, the paper says,
it must make a further decision on whether to classify the service as either
of two things.
The paper describes them:
The two forms of control
| Standard control | generally used for services supplied to most customers (e.g. common distribution services). The cost sits in the network’s regulated revenue and is recovered from everyone through network charges. |
|---|---|
| Alternative control | generally used for customer-specific services (e.g. public lighting), including those where there may be the potential for competition. The cost is aimed at the people who use the service. |
The paper adds that when making that call the AER must consider the extent to which the
costs of providing the services are directly attributable to particular users, and the potential
for competition to develop
.
So the AEMC decides whether networks may do this at all. The AER decides who pays for it. Only the second decision reaches your bill, and it is the one getting less attention.
The AEMC is not unaware of the interaction. Its Question 11 asks stakeholders directly whether
the costs and benefits of the ENA proposal
would differ depending on whether the AER classifies the service as a standard control service
or an alternative control service
. That question is an invitation, and at least one group of
submitters took it up in detail.
The submission that makes the argument plainly
Four independent consumer advocates, Mark Henley, Mark Grenning, Helen Bartley and Dean Lombard, lodged a submission the AEMC received on 4 August 2026. It is unusually direct about the mechanics.
Their framing of the split matches the paper’s: the AEMC’s decision is whether EV
charging infrastructure should be a distribution service, and the AER’s is the form of
control. Then they state the consequence:
standard control services are paid for by all consumers irrespective of whether they have an
EV. Alternative control services are paid by EV owners.
And then, memorably:
We do not think it consistent with the NEO that a pensioner renting in Woy Woy should
cross subsidise the owner of a Porsche EV living in a Paddington terrace and parking their car on
the street.
The NEO is the National Electricity Objective, the statutory test the AEMC must apply. The line is rhetorical, and deliberately so, but the underlying point is a distributional one that holds without the flourish: EV ownership currently skews towards higher incomes, and network charges are paid by everyone with a meter, including renters who cannot install a charger and households that will never own an EV.
The emissions argument, and the number nobody has produced
There is a serious counter to that, and the submission engages with it rather than dodging it. If more public charging accelerates EV uptake, everyone benefits from lower transport emissions, which is an argument for spreading the cost across everyone.
The advocates’ answer is not that the benefit is imaginary. It is that nobody has
measured it against the alternatives. They note there is
no willingness-to-pay evidence for those who are paying for the service but who do not own
EVs
, and that the networks have not provided a marginal cost of abatement curve
that
would let anyone compare this way of reducing emissions with other ways of reducing emissions.
That is a specific, answerable challenge rather than a rhetorical one. A marginal abatement cost curve is a standard tool. If network-built kerbside charging is a cheap way to shift a tonne of carbon, that can be shown. If it is expensive relative to the alternatives, spreading its cost across every household is harder to defend on emissions grounds.
The submission also proposes a middle path rather than a flat no. If regulated provision is
justified at all, it says, it should not be permanent:
A five-year limit, followed by an assessment of whether the classification remains
justified
. Their broader test is that
the relevant question is not whether DNSPs can provide these services, but whether consumers
need them to do so as a regulated service where competitive providers already exist
.
What the charging companies say, and why to weigh it carefully
Tesla, which operates charging infrastructure in Australia and therefore has a direct
commercial interest in the outcome, asked the Commission to reject the ENA request outright. Its
submission says the proposal
would let distribution networks own kerbside EV chargers as a regulated service, paid for by
every electricity customer
, and argues that
Public charging is a normal retail service that a competitive market is already delivering, at
scale, with private money
.
That is a competitor arguing against a competitor, and the commercial interest is obvious on its face. It is worth reading for that reason, not despite it: an incumbent charging operator and a group of consumer advocates with no commercial stake have arrived at overlapping conclusions from very different starting points.
Where the process actually stands
Submissions on the consultation paper closed on 23 July 2026, but the AEMC has continued to publish late ones through August, including submissions received on 14 and 20 August. The Commission held a hybrid public forum in Sydney on 18 August 2026, a second forum is scheduled for October 2026, and the final report is due on 17 December 2026.
One thing we could not read: at the time of writing the AEMC’s project page lists the public forum slides as a pending document, so what was actually said at the 18 August forum is not yet on the public record. When those slides appear we will read them.
Our view
The ownership question has had the attention because it is the dramatic one. The classification question is the one with a number attached to it, and it is being decided by a regulator most people have never heard of, at a later stage, through a process with far less public visibility than a rule change.
On the facts above, alternative control is the better default. Not because kerbside charging is a bad idea, and not because networks are the wrong builders. Simply because the case for making every customer pay currently rests on an emissions benefit that has been asserted but not quantified, and the tool for quantifying it is standard and available. Produce the abatement cost curve and the argument can be had properly. Until then, the party that can point to a measurable benefit is the driver plugging in.
If the answer turns out to be standard control, that is a decision to socialise the cost of kerbside charging across every household with a meter. That may well be the right call. It should be made in the open, with the numbers on the table, and not as a technical footnote to a rule change that was reported as being about something else.
How we did this
Every quotation above was checked character by character against the source PDF it is attributed to. The classification mechanics come from the AEMC’s own consultation paper rather than from any submitter’s characterisation of them, because the split between what the AEMC decides and what the AER decides is the spine of this piece and a critic’s summary is not good enough for that. The consumer advocates’ submission is quoted from the document the AEMC published, not from any report of it.
The dates and the status of the process come from the AEMC’s Package 1 project page, read on 22 August 2026. We did not attend the 18 August forum and make no claim about what was said there. We approached no party for comment; this piece reports published documents. The section headed “Our view” is opinion built on the sourced facts above it. No claim is made about the conduct of any network, and describing Tesla’s commercial interest is a statement about its business, not its honesty.
Sources
- Australian Energy Market Commission, Consultation paper, Electricity Network Regulation Review Package 1 (EPR0106, ERC0435, ERC0437) (PDF, 25 June 2026, read 22 August 2026): the ENA rule change request and its stated rationale, the description of standard control and alternative control services, the factors the AER must consider, and Question 11 on whether costs and benefits differ by form of control.
- Mark Henley, Mark Grenning, Helen Bartley and Dean Lombard, (Verbal) Submission to the Electricity Network Regulation Review (ENRR) Package #1 (PDF, 4 August 2026, read 22 August 2026): the equity argument, the standard versus alternative control consequence, the willingness-to-pay and marginal abatement cost points, and the proposed five-year limit.
- Tesla, Submission, AEMC Electricity Network Regulation Review Package 1 (PDF, read 22 August 2026): its opposition to the ENA rule change request and its characterisation of public charging as a competitive retail service.
- Australian Energy Market Commission, Electricity Network Regulation Review Package 1 (project page, read 22 August 2026): the 23 July 2026 submission close, the submissions received in August, the 18 August 2026 Sydney public forum, the October 2026 second forum, the 17 December 2026 final report date, and the public forum slides listed as a pending document.
Spotted an error? Tell us and we will check it against the sources and log the outcome here.